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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in refusing the Appellant's motion to
dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery and reduce the charge
to simple robbery?

(as no weapon or facsimile of a weapon was

used)
Did the trial court err in failing to suppress all evidence
obtained from the constitutionally invalid stop of the
Appellant?
Did the trial court err in allowing into evidence the prior
convictions of the Appellant?
Did the trial court err in refusing the Appellant's motion to
suppress the identification testimony of Officer Merrick which
was based upon a suggestive one-photo show-up?
Did the trial court commit error when it refused to give the
Appellant's cautionary eyewitness identification instruction
to the jury?

iv.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 860325

HENRY S. BRUCE, JR.
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Henry Bruce for
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended).

A jury found him guilty following

a trial on April 24-29, 1986, in the Third District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H.
Russon, Judge presiding.

Mr. Bruce was committed to the Utah State

Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to life.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 26, 1985 at approximately 3:00 in the
afternoon, the Corner Mart gas and convenience store on Tenth North
and 950 West in Salt Lake City received a phone call.

The caller, a

male voice, told the employee, Sue Ann Candelaria, that he had a gun
pointed at her; she was then instructed to put all the money in a
bag and give it to a man who would be entering the store or the
caller would shoot at her (R. 308). A few minutes later a black man
entered the store, placed his hand under his jacket, pointed his
finger like a gun, and told the employee to "do what the man on the
phone said" (R. 307-09).

The employee gave the man the money, two hundred and
fourteen dollars (R. 340-41).

The man then exited the Corner Mart/

turned the corner/ and headed north on foot (R. 385-86).

Ruthie K.

Barton, the sister of Sue Ann Candelariaf was visiting her sister at
the Corner Mart at the time of the robbery.

Both sisters testified

that they observed the robber appear to stick the money into the
front of h.is pants as he ran away (R. 312-13/ 492). Ms. Barton
followed the robber at a distance of about twenty-five to thirty
feet (R. 354-55).

Ms. Barton testified that she observed the robber

cross the street and enter a walkway betv/een two apartment buildings
(R. 355-56).

She testified that after crossing the street behind

the robber/ she walked through the nearby parking lot; she said that
she did not see the robber again (R. 357). Ms. Barton testified
that she did see an orange car, a station wagon, drive away from the
apartment parking lot (R. 357-58).

Her testimony was very clear,

however, that she did not see anyone get in the car, nor could she
see any of the occupants of the car (R. 357, 386-87).
Ms. Barton then testified that she returned to the Corner
Mart and told police officers, who arrived within minutes, what had
occurred (R. 360-61).

An all-channel police broadcast was then

disseminated by the police officers (R. 162). That broadcast stated
that an armed robbery had occurred and for all officers to "be on
alert for a suspicious-type car, . . . an orange Volkswagen, small
four-door sedan or Volkswagen" (R. 163, 172). The broadcast also
indicated that two black males were in the front seat of that
vehicle (R. 163, 172). Police Officer Hill heard that broadcast and
drove toward the direction of the robbery (R. 163). He soon
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observed an orange datsun four-door sedan or stationwagon with two
black males in the front seat (R. 164).
Officer Hill followed this car for about three blocks and
at one point "observed action in the front seat" (R. 165). He
described the action as "people moving and it seemed like one of the
two occupants/ the passenger occupant in that vehicle, had placed a
coat or something in the back seat, which naturally being a
policeman, alerted me to the fact that something was going on" (R.
165).

On cross-examination he clarified his testimony stating that

the passenger had nothing in his hand and only turned his body
toward the back seat looking into it or reaching into it and then
exchanged words with the driver (R. 173-74).
did the vehicle increase speed (R. 173-74).

At no point, however,
He then notified the

dispatcher that he was going to apprehend or pull over the car (R.
165).

Officer Hill testified that he made the stop because in his

mind the passengers were "possible armed robbery suspects" (R. 174).
Officer Hill pulled the car over using a "high intensity
stop", ordered them out of the car, and with his gun drawn
instructed the men to place their hands on top of the car (R.
166-68).

A number of other officers then arrived, frisked the

suspects, and continued the investigation (R. 169-70).

Mr. Bruce,

the passenger, and Mr. Latham, the driver, were detained until a
witness arrived to make an identification (R. 431).
Another broadcast was then made back to the Corner Mart
informing the officers there that a suspect vehicle had been stopped
and an inquiry was made whether a witness could come to identify the
vehicle and suspects (R. 361). Ms. Barton overheard the broadcast

and indicated a desire to go with the officers to make the
identification (R. 208). She accompanied a police officer to the
location where the vehicle had been stopped and immediately
identified it as the car that had left the apartment complex (R.
361-62).

She then identified both black men with the police

officers.

She identified one as the robber of the store and the

other as a man who had been in the store the prior evening inquiring
about the phone number (R. 363-66).

The identification of Mr. Bruce

as the robber of the Corner Mart was made solely from the clothing
he was wearing, dark corduroys and a sweat jacket (R. 388). After
the identification of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Latham by Ms. Barton, they
were placed under arrest (R. 444-46).

Police officers then searched

the suspects and the vehicle; they found three one dollar bills on
the floor of the vehicle, $104.93 on Mr. Latham, and $101.00 tucked
into the front of Mr. Bruce's pants (R. 431-34).
Prior to trial, counsel for defendant made several
motions.

She moved for the evidence of the eyewitness

identification of Ms.Barton to be excluded because of the suggestive
nature of the process employed (R. 275-76).

That motion was denied

by the trial court (R. 283). A motion was also made to prevent the
state from impeaching the testimony of Mr. Bruce by introducing
evidence of prior convictions (R. 230-32).
denied by the trial court (R. 290-91).

That motion was also

Also, a motion was made to

exclude all evidence obtained from the arrest scene as it was the
fruits of a constitutionally invalid stop (R. 216-26).
was also denied (R. 227-28).
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That motion

A police lineup of Mr. Bruce and seven others was conducted
wherein Sue Ann Candelaria, her sister Ruthie K. Barton, and Janine
Dempsey, a salesperson from the nearby Self's Food Store,
participated.

None of them picked Mr. Bruce as the robber.

Both

Ms. Candelaria and Ms. Barton selected the same other individual
from the lineup as the one who had robbed the Corner Mart (R. 316,
405-07).

Ms. Dempsey selected no one at all as she was just unsure

(R. 469-73).
Yet, at the preliminary hearing, both of the sisters picked
Mr. Bruce as the robber.

Ms. Candelaria testified that she had

noticed him earlier in the line-up but was told that she had picked
the wrong man (R. 337, 346). Regarding the identification of Mr.
Bruce as the robber, Ms. Candelaria, during the preliminary hearing,
stated, "You know what you are suppose to do.
months.

I don't know what he looks like.

It has been two

He did it, so what is the

big deal?" (R. 339). Ms. Barton, like her sister, was told that she
had picked the wrong man (R. 406-07); subsequently, she identified
Mr. Bruce at the preliminary hearing as the robber of the Corner
Mart (R. 403). Ms. Dempsey did not participate in the preliminary
hearing (R. 473). At trial, all three identified Mr.Bruce as the
robber (R. 307, 349, 465).

In all of these in-court

identifications, Mr. Bruce was the only young black man in the room
(R. 335-36).
A fourth witness, Officer John Merrick, an employee of the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office assigned to the County Jail,
testified at trial.

His testimony allegedly placed Mr. Bruce at a

phone booth near the Corner Mart around the time of the robbery (R.
484-86).

Counsel for Mr. Bruce moved the trial court to suppress

the testimony of Officer Merrick because his testimony was the
product of a suggestive one-photo showup (R. 157). The trial court
denied that motion (R. 482-83).

Officer Merrick observed the men at

the phone booth for less than two minutes from a distance of one
hundred yards—across the width of the street and across a parking
lot—while he was waiting for two distinct traffic lights on his way
to and from the Seven-Eleven prior to going goose hunting (R.
490-92).

During that time the two men were moving around and he

could only see a frontal view part of the time (R. 491). He
testified that he recognized Otis Latham by name but did not
recognize the other man (R. 262-65).
following day.

Upon returning to work the

Officer Merrick went to the docket sheet, found the

name of Otis Latham and saw that Henry Bruce was the person arrested
with Latham.

He then went to Mr.Bruce's arrest file, looked at the

single photo inside and concluded that the man in the photo was the
man at the phone booth the day before (R. 266-74, 494). Merrick
testified, however, outside the presence of the jury during the
motion to exclude his testimony, that he had no prior face to face
conversations nor confrontations with Mr. Bruce; he had only seen
him once or twice before in the halls of the County Jail (R. 272,
493).
After the prosecution presented its evidence, counsel for
the Defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated
robbery and to reduce the charge to simple robbery (R. 497-503).
This motion was based on the fact that no evidence of use of a
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weapon or facsimile of a weapon was shown by the state.

Evidence

was very explicit that the witnesses had not seen a weapon and that
they had been very aware that the robber was using his finger rather
than a gun or facsimile of a gun (R. 309). The trial court denied
the motion and gave both the aggravated robbery and simple robbery
verdict forms to the jury (R. 503).
Mr. Bruce testified in his own behalf (R. 503-24).

He

denied that he had been involved in the robbery (R. 514). He stated
that he had been walking from the house of one friend to the house
of another friend when Mr. Latham stopped him and offered to give
him a ride (R. 505-06).

The money he was carrying was the earnings

from his recent employment; he carried it in his pants in the manner
he had ever since he had once been mugged back in the ghetto of
Kansas City where he grew up (R. 512). Mr. Bruce admitted prior
convictions on direct examination (R. 513). The parties stipulated
to the fact that officers dusted for and found fingerprints in the
store on the counter and the bar across the door where the robber
had touched; those fingerprints did not match those of the defendant
(R. 496).
Mr. Bruce testified that he has had a gold-capped front
tooth, and a tattoo on his forehead from 1972 and 1969, respectively
(R. 513). None of the witnesses used those physical characteristics
to identify Mr. Bruce.
Counsel for Mr. Bruce requested and profferred a cautionary
eyewitness instruction to be given to the jury (R. 578-79).

She

based the request on the fact that eyewitness identification was at

- 7

-

issue.

The trial court denied that motion and counsel for the

Defendant took exception to that denial (R. 578-79).
The jury returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict
on the charge of aggravated robbery (R. 580).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal Appellant, Henry Bruce, first contends that the
trial court should have dismissed the charge of aggravated robbery
in favor of a charge of simple robbery.

No weapon was used during

the commission of the crime so no aggravated robbery occurred.
Mr. Bruce alleges that evidence obtained during an illegal
stop and arrest should have been suppressed.

No probable cause

existed nor could a reasonable suspicion be articulated to support
the stop of the vehicle which led to Mr. Bruce's arrest.
The Appellant asserts that evidence of his prior
convictions should have been excluded.

The trial court

misinterpreted Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in permitting
introduction of the previous convictions.

The prior convictions did

not demonstrate the defendant's propensity to lie under oath but did
prejudice the jury against the defendant,.
Mr. Bruce contends the identification testimony of one of
the prosecution's witnesses should have been suppressed because it
was the result of a suggestive show-up.
Finally, the Appellant contends that instruction regarding
identification testimony should have been given to the jury.

The

instruction was justified in this case because of the faulty and
varying identifications of the defendant made by the various
prosecution witnesses.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE AND TO REDUCE
THE CHARGE TO SIMPLE ROBBERY.
At the end of the prosecution's case, counsel for the
defendant moved to dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery and to
reduce the charge to simple robbery (R. 497-503).

Mr. Bruce now

contends that the trial court committed error when it denied that
motion (R.503).
The defense motion was based on the fact that no evidence
was presented by the prosecution which supported the charge of
aggravated robbery.

The prosecution offered no weapon into evidence

nor was evidence presented that one was used in the robbery.

Both

witnesses unequivocally and consistently testified that they knew
the robber did not have a gun.

Ms. Candelaria testifiedf "It [his

hand under his jacket] just looked like a normal thingf like a gun,
but it wasn't.

I knew it wasn't."

(R.309).

Similarly/ her sister,

Ms. Barton, testified, "He had his hands in his pocket like this,
acting like he had a gun in his pocket " (R.350).
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO THE JURY.
The trial court is required by statute to decide all
questions of law.

Utah Code Ann. §78-21-3 states,

All questions of law, including the admissibility
of evidence, the facts preliminary to such
admission, the construction of statutes and other
writings, and the application of the rules of
evidence are to be decided by the court and all
discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the
knowledge of the court is by law made evidence of
a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to
the jury, who are bound to accept it.
_ Q

In the case at bar no factual dispute existed regarding whether the
robber used a weapon.

Evidence demonstrated that the robber had not

used a weapon, therefore, the court was obligated to take from the
jury any question regarding aggravating robbery.
The only possible question remaining from the facts is
whether a hand/finger, though admittedly recognized as "not a gun,"
can legally be a facsimile of a firearm as required by Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-302.
this question.

(See Addendum A.)

However, case law forecloses

In State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah 1977), this

Court cited with approval a decision from a New York court which
spoke to this matter.

The New York court defined the word

imitation—held by this Court in Turner to be a synonym of
"facsimile" — a s follows:
The word imitation when applied to pistols and
revolvers means so nearly resembling the genuine
as to mislead, with the apparent object of
producing, and likely to produce, upon the minds
of those against whom it is to be used, the
belief that the imitation weapon, is capable of
producing all the injurious consequences to the
victim as the use of the genuine article itself.
People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (1955).

Inasmuch as the

witnesses were neither misled nor possessed a belief that the
finger/hand was a weapon, the statutory requirement of a "weapon or
facsimile of a weapon" could not legally be met.

Accordingly, the

trial court in the case at bar erred in denying the motion to reduce
the charge from aggravated robbery to simple robbery.

Mr. Bruce's

conviction, therefore should be reversed and a conviction on the
lesser charge imposed or a new trial awarded.
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If this Court finds, however, that whether a facsimile of a
weapon was used in the robbery is a question for the jury, then the
jury verdict should still be overturned because the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to establish that a weapon or facsimile of
a weapon was used.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A CONVICTION ON THE
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE.
The standard this Court employs for reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well
established.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983),

this Court stated, "[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of
the jury's decision this Court still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."

Further, the

Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
Id. at 444.

Even stretching the evidence to its logical limit,

however, the reviewing court may not take a speculative leap to
bridge a gap between the evidence needed to convict and the evidence
actually presented at trial.

Petree, 659 P.2d at 445. This

standard restates the due process requirement which prohibits a
criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which a defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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In order to survive appellate scrutiny, the jury's verdict
in this case must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that each element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 states the elements of the crime of

aggravated robbery.

For a conviction on this charge the prosecution

must show that during the course of a robbery a defendant "(a)
[u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or facsimile of
a knife or a deadly weapon; or (b) [clauses serious bodily injury
upon another."

Section (b) of the statute is not applicable to

considerations in the case at bar as no such allegations were made.
The appropriate consideration is only whether a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm was used in the course of the robbery.
As part A of this point states, both witnesses testified
that they knew the robber was using his hand/finger and not a gun.
That testimony effectively precludes the element of an actual
firearm, leaving for discussion only the question of a facsimile of
a firearm.

Part A above also discusses the definition of facsimile

adopted by this Court, requiring the victims to be misled by the
facsimile producing in them a belief that the imitation is capable
of the same consequences as the genuine article.

As both witnesses

recognized this "facsimile" as the hand/finger of the robber, they
could not have believed that the same consequences could come from
the hand/finger as from an actual firearm.

Accordingly, the

evidence is lacking that a reasonable person could not have reached
the verdict in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Support for this position is found in State v. Ulibarri,
668 P.2d 568 (Utah 1983).

In that case an individual entered a
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store, took beer, and began to leave when questioned by the
employee.

The robber then placed his hand in his pocket and stated,

"Everything's cool, hold it there or I'll blow you away."

In that

case the defendant was charged and convicted of simple robbery.

The

defendant appealed to reduce the charge to theft, but this Court
held, in a per curiam opinion, that the factual circumstances
supported the conviction of robbery.

Essentially, the facts of

Ulibarri are the same as in the case at bar.

Fairness and justice

requires that similarly situated defendants should be treated in
similar fashion and, therefore, Mr. Bruce should be convicted of
nothing greater than the similarly situated defendant in Ulibarri.
The evidence presented by the prosecution in Mr. Bruce's
case was insufficient to support the guilty verdict on the charge of
aggravated robbery.

The trial court erred originally in even

submitting the charge of aggravated robbery to the jury.

The

verdict reached by the jury was such that reasonable minds could not
have reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly,

this Court should exercise its reviewing powers and reverse the
conviction of Mr. Bruce, impose a verdict on the lesser charge, or
grant a new trial.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS OBTAINED FROM AN ILLEGAL
STOP AND ARREST OF MR. BRUCE
Prior to trial counsel for the defendant moved to suppress
evidence obtained from the stop and eventual arrest of Mr. Bruce (R.
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216-26).

Mr. Bruce contends that the trial court committed

prejudicial error when it denied that motion (R. 227-28).
The stop and arrest of Mr. Bruce was conducted in violation
of the guarantees of the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Utah.

In the case at bar, Police

Officer Hill based his stop of Mr. Bruce upon all all-channel
broadcast over his police radio (R. 162). That broadcast instructed
officers to be on the lookout for an orange Datsun or Volkswagon,
four door sedan or station wagon, being driven by two black males
suspected of robbery, both riding in the front seat (R. 162, 172).
Shortly thereafter Officer Hill spotted an orange vehicle with two
blacks inside, assumed it to be the suspect vehicle, followed it for
three blocks, and then stopped it (R. 164-66).
The error complained of in this case is the lack of a basis
for the initial broadcast which, in theory, gave Officer Hill the
probable cause to stop the vehicle and which led to the arrest of
Mr. Bruce.

The law is clear that an arrest is constitutional if it

is made under the authority of an arrest warrant issued upon a
showing of probable cause.

Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.

480 (1958), as explained in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 N.3
(1964).

Absent a warrant, an arrest may still be constitutional if

made for a felony on probable cause known to the arresting officer.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1976).

However,

whether a warrantless arrest may be constitutional if made for a
felony on probable cause not known to the arresting officer but
passed on to him by another source, is less clear.
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Cases treating this question seem to resolve it as
contingent upon the particular factual circumstances of the case.
Annotation, What Constitutes Probable Cause for Arrest—Supreme
Court Cases, 28 L.Ed.2d 978 (1971).

With information from

confidential informants, for example, their basis of knowledge,
credibility and reliability remain proper considerations to be
weighed under a totality of the circumstances standard.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983).

Illinois v.

Generally, reasonably trustworthy

information received from others, when corroborated by the officer's
personal knowledge, will furnish probable cause for an arrest.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
A case demonstrative of reasonably trustworthy information
that was received from others and then corroborated by police
officers is Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

In Chambers, a

robbery victim informed police that one of his robbers was wearing a
green sweater, the other a trench coat.

Witnesses in the area heard

of the robbery and informed police that they had observed a light
blue compact station wagon circling the block and then later
speeding from a parking lot near the robbery site.

These witnesses

informed the police that one of the four within the car was wearing
a green sweater.

The police then broadcast the description of the

car, the green sweater, and the trench coat.

Later, other officers

spotted and stopped a light blue compact station wagon carrying four
men, one wearing a green sweater.

The United States Supreme Court

held that probable cause existed for the police officers to make the
stop and arrest.

The Court's decision was based primarily on the strength of
the detailed information from the victim and the witnesses which
together gave the police the probable cause to issue the broadcast.
On this matter the Court stated, "Having talked to the teen-age
observers and to the victim Kovachich, the police had ample cause to
stop a light blue compact station wagon carrying four men and to
arrest the occupants/ one of whom was wearing a green sweater and
one of whom had a trench coat with him in the car."
46-47.

399 U.S. at

The police who investigated the crime had enough detailed

information to establish probable cause and to broadcast that
information.

The officers who made the stop were able to

corroborate a light blue compact station wagon, four riders, one of
whom was wearing a green sweater.

By corroborating the information

they too acted with probable cause.
However, in another police radio bulletin case, Whiteley v.
Warden of Wyoming State Penetentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), a
different result was reached.

In Whiteley a rural Sheriff prepared

a complaint which provided a basis for an arrest warrant issued by a
justice of the peace.

The complaint, however, unlike in Chambers,

was based upon unsupported information from a tip and was totally
insufficient to support the warrant.

The Sheriff nonetheless issued

a bulletin describing the two suspects and detailing the automobile
they would likely be driving.

The radio broadcast was disseminated

and police officers in Laramie, on the basis of the broadcast but
without the warrant, spotted the described vehicle and occupants and
made the stop and eventual arrest.

The Court pointed out that the

arresting officers were not themselves possessed of any factual data
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corroborating the Sheriff's bulletin that these suspects had
committed the burglary in question.
lack of probable cause.

The defendant argued error for

The State responded that the Laramie

officers reasonably relied upon the radio bulletin and not the
Sheriff's bogus complaint.

The United States Supreme Court decided

the matter by stating:
We do not, of course, question that the Larmie
police were entitled to act on the strength of
the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers
called upon to aid other officers in executing
arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the
officers requesting aid offered the magistrate
the information requisite to support an
independent judicial assessment of probable
cause. Where, however, the contrary turns out to
be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be
insulated from challenge by the decision of the
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to
make an arrest.
Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).

The United States

Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered excluded all
evidence gathered by virtue of this illegal arrest.

Id. at 569.

In the case at bar, testimony showed that the robber of the
Corner Mart left the store on foot, turned the corner and headed
north (R. 385-86).

He was followed at a distance of about

twenty-five to thirty feet by a witness, Ms. Barton, who testified
that she observed him cross a street and eventually enter a walkway
between two apartment buildings (R. 355-56).

At that point Ms.

Barton said she walked through the nearby parking lot.

She

testified that she did not see the robber again (R. 357), but did
see an orange c a r — a station wagon—drive away from the apartment
complex.

Her testimony, was explicity clear, however, that she was
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unable to see how many people were in the car or what the
occupant(s) looked like (R. 357, 386-87).
Ms. Barton later testified that she lived in one of the
apartments of the complex.

She testified that she was familiar with

the automobiles of the other residents, and that the orange car did
not belong to any of them (R. 424). However, she also admitted that
a substantial number of businesses were located within a half block
of the area, and that the street in question is a thoroughfare or
mainstreet of the area (R. 424-26).
Ms. Barton then testified that she returned to the store
and told the police officers, who arrived within minutes, what had
occurred (R. 360-61).

She then stated that "[t]hey talked to us and

[sic] for a minute, and then there was a dispatch over the radio.
They had a car stopped that fit the description of the person" (R.
361).

Ms. Barton then accompanied a police officer to where the car

was stopped and identified the car as the one she had seen leave the
apartment complex (R. 361-62).

Subsequently she identified Mr.

Bruce as the robber she had followed from the Corner Mart (R.
363-64).
The constitutional error reveals itself at this point.
Inasmuch as the witness could not place the robber in the orange
automobile, no probable cause existed for the officers at the
robbery scene to issue a police broadcast which took such liberties
with the facts.

The facts only demonstrated that one robber, a

Black, headed south into a walkway between the complex.

The witness

saw no one in the orange car; the police broadcast, however, placed
not one but two black males in the orange car.
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A magistrate would

not have been able to make such a speculative leap from the facts to
issue a warrant, and police officers in the field who are "engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" are to
be given even less deference than a neutral magistrate's
determination of probable cause.

See United States v, Watson, 423

U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964);
and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105709 (1965).
Factually, the case at bar is more similar to Whiteley than
to Chambers.

Chambers can be distinguished inasmuch as the

witnesses there placed the green sweatered robber in the light blue
compact station wagon which suspiciously circled the area and then
sped away from a nearby parking lot at the time of the robbery.

The

green sweatered robber was also identified by the victim, and the
police officers who made the arrest from the broadcast saw the green
sweater in the light blue compact station wagon and were able to
correctly rely on the probable cause which supported the broadcast.
In this case the situation is more similar to Whiteley
where officers' reliance on the police broadcast could not withstand
scrutiny of the probable cause question.

Officer Hill, like the

Laramie officers in Whiteley, was entitled to act on the radio
bulletin assuming probable cause, but his actions were not supported
by true probable cause and therefore were illegal and "cannot be
insulated from challenge by the decision of the investigating
officer to rely on fellow officers to make an arrest."

Whiteley,

401 U.S. at 568.
Considerations of public policy demand this result; a
standard which allows police officers the benefit of the doubt in
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drawing gaping inferences from inconclusive facts would deteriorate
the important constitutional preference for warrants as mandated by
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1 # §14 of the Constitution of Utah.

A decision against Mr. Bruce in

this case on these facts would encourage police officers to neglect
the warrant preference, would depreciate the impartial judgments of
magistrates, and would have a chilling effect on the rights of
citizens to travel freely without intrusive police investigations
based on little more than the whim or caprice of the officer on the
beat.
As in Whiteley the evidence that was gathered subsequent to
the illegal arrest should have been excluded from trial as fruits of
the poisonous tree.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The trial

court committed error in denying the defendant's motion to exclude
the evidence, and this Court should reverse the conviction of Mr.
Bruce and order a new trial.
Lacking probable cause, a police officer may still stop an
automobile for investigatory purposes; however, the law requires
that the police officer must possess an "articulable suspicion" to
afford him the right to so stop and detain an individual.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).

Terry v.

Any stop and detention must be reasonable

both at inception and in scope.

Id. at 19-20.

In the case at bar,

police officer Hill stopped the vehicle in which Mr.Bruce was a
passenger because he had heard a police radio broadast and believed
that the car and passengers matched the broadcast.

He testified

that he made the stop because in his mind the passengers were
"possible armed robbery suspects"

(R. 174). He had followed the
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car for three blocks before pulling it over but was unable to
articulate any suspicious behavior on the part of the passengers
other than the non-driver at one point turned his left shoulder and
looked into or reached into the back seat and then exchanged words
with the driver (R. 173-74).

The car at no time, however, increased

its speed after that exchange (R. 174),
Examining the facts against the Terry-stop requirements,
the initial question is whether the stop was reasonable at its
inception.

The answer is clearly no.

As the police broadcast was

without a factual basis, Police Officer Hill could not claim his
articulable suspicion from that information.

Such a claim should be

smissed for the same legal reasonings and policy considerations
gued above.

The only additional evidence that police officer Hill

d to rely upon for his articulable suspicion is that the passenger
aned over his shoulder and looked into or reached for something in
the back seat.

Such action is hardly tantamount to suspicious

behavior giving the police officer the right to stop the
automobile.

Therefore, the police officer violated the rights of

the defendant when he made the stop without the required articulable
suspicion.

Any and all evidence obtained from that point on,

accordingly, should be excluded from use at trial.

Mapp v. Ohio,

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
As the reasonableness at inception requirement was not met
on these facts, discussion of the reasonableness of the scope of the
detention need not be presented.

The police radio broadcast was

totally without a basis in fact; everything that evolved from that
point forward was tainted.

If, however, Officer Hill had been able
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to articulate an independent suspicion to pull over and investigate,
the new suspicion may have rehabilitated the ill-founded broadcast.
Officer Hill was unable to articulate such a suspicion, and as such,
the resulting evidence that was uncovered by the illegal stop should
have been excluded by the trial court.
the defendant.

Failure to do so prejudiced

Mr. Bruce's conviction should now be overturned and

a new trial ordered in which the tainted evidence could not be used.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S
PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF HIS
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Bruce moved the trial court
for an order to prevent the State from impeaching the credibility of
Mr. Bruce with evidence of his prior convictions.

Mr. Bruce's prior

record included a 1980 conviction for retail theft, a second degree
felony; a 1979 conviction for attempted burglary, a Class A
misdemeanor; and a 1984 conviction for retail theft, a Class A
misdemeanor (R. 230-32).
290-91).

The trial court denied the motion (R.

Mr. Bruce now contends that the denial of the motion to

exclude evidence of prior convictions constituted reversible error
by the trial court because the prior convictions did not involve
dishonesty or false statement as required by Rule 609 (a)(2).
The State, during the pre-trial discussion of the motion,
openly indicated a desire to use the prior convictions to impeach
the credibility of Mr. Bruce at trial (R. 286). Aware of the
State's intent an.d in spite of the trial court's denial of the
motion, Mr. Bruce still decided to testify at trial so that his
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story might be heard.

Therefore, in an effort to reduce the

negative impact of the prior convictions on the jury, and also
because of the State's expressed intent to use the prior convictions
to impeach credibility, counsel for Mr. Bruce took the strategic
position of introducing the prior convictions during the Defendant's
direct testimony (R. 513). This strategy was employed by counsel so
that the shock value of prior criminal conduct could be minimized
and so that the Defendant would not be seen to be hiding something
which would be uncovered during cross-examination.1
The trial court relied on a Utah case, State v. Cintron,
680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), to deny the motion to exclude prior
convictions (R. 290-91).

This reliance, however, was misplaced;

1

Mr. Bruce acknowledges case precedent which implies a waiver of
the claim of error in denying the motion to not allow impeachment by
prior convictions if the prior conviction is brought out on direct
as opposed to cross examination. However, Mr. Bruce contends that
such cases are pre-Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), cases,
and because Luce now requires that a defendant must take the stand
in his own behalf to preserve a claim, those prior cases which imply
a waiver should be strongly resisted.
Policy considerations and fundamental fairness demand that if the
defendant must take the stand to preserve a claim for appeal,
counsel may employ a strategy to bring out the prior convictions on
direct examination. To do otherwise would grant unwarranted
advantage to the State. The jury would doubtfully understand the
legal technicality forbidding the defendant from being completely
truthful and honest with the jury about prior convictions; and when
such information was "uncovered" by the State on cross examination,
the jury would subconsciously, if not consciously, discount the
credibility of the defendant. The jury would infer from the
defendant's conduct an intent on his part to hide or hope to hide
the information of prior convictions.
This Court should therefore not foreclose Mr. Bruce's appeal on
this issue based on antiquated legal reasoning which contradicts the
defendant's desire to testify and deliver the "whole" truth to the
jury who will determine his guilt or innocence.
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Cintron was decided under the old rule, Rule 21, which was in effect
prior to the adoption of the federal rules, which governed the trial
of this case.

As will be discussed below, the adoption of the

federal rules indicated a "fresh start" for the evidence law of
Utah.

The new rules were to be guided with an eye to federal case

law for interpretation, and the new rules would supplant all
inconsistent rules and statutes.

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,

1334 n.40 (Utah 1986) (stating that to the extent that previous
opinions are inconsistent with Rule 609, they are overruled).
Cintron was a per curiam opinion wherein the Court briefly
concluded that theft impliedly is admissible for impeachment
purposes as it involves dishonesty.

That position, however, is

unsupported and remains inconsistent with federal cases as will be
demonstrated below.

As Cintron is inconsistent with the purposes of

the federal rules as well as case precedents, that decision should
be overruled and play no role in defining the new rule.
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence2 governs the
question of impeachment of the defendant as a witness by evidence of
prior convicionts.

(See Addendum B).

On April 13, 1983, this Court

adopted new evidence rules substantially patterned after the Federal
Rules of Evidence.

These rules became effective in Utah on

September 1, 1983.

The rule in question in this case, Rule 609(a)

was adopted verbatim from the federal rules.

Speaking to that

matter, the Committee which promulgated the rules stated, "The

1

The record incorrectly refers to this rule as 409. Rule 409
relates to the payment of medical and similar expenses and has no
relevance in this discussion. See Addendum B for Rule 609.
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1983 Utah Rules of Evidence . . . supplant the 1971 Rules and all
other inconsistent statutes or rules. "^

The Committee also added,

"These rules therefore supply a fresh starting place for the law of
evidence. . ."

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986).

Specific to the case at hand is Rule 609(a)(2), which
concerns impeachment by conviction for offenses involving dishonesty
or false statement.

During the pre-trial discussion of the motion

on this issue, counsel for Mr. Bruce stated that the question the
Court had to reach was whether any of the prior convictions were
automatically admissible in that they involved dishonesty or false
statement (R. 231-32).

The prosecutor agreed with that

characterization of the issue (R. 232), and then later stated:
[A]ll we would claim for the prior conviction is
the section 2 involving dishonesty and false
statement, regardless of the punishment. We are
not claiming under section one. We are not
claiming this is more probative than prejudicial.
. . . So, we are not going to argue that. The
only issue the State sees is whether these prior
convictions are convictions that involve
dishonesty or false statement (R. 237).
While the parties agreed that the issue involved an (a)(2) question,
the rule is rather new and this Court has not yet addressed what
crimes qualify as crimes of dishonesty or false statement under
(a)(2).

However, as the Utah rule is a verbatim replica of the

federal rule, ample federal case law exists to act as a guide.
Furthermore, the preliminary note to the new Utah Rules of Evidence
states, "Since the advisory committee generally sought to achieve

3

See footnote 6 and accompanying text of Boyce, Utah Rules of
Evidence 1983, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64.
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uniformity between Utah's rules and the federal rules, this Court
looks to the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal
courts to aid in interpreting the Utah rules."

State v. Banner, 717

P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986).
The federal courts are not in complete agreement on what
constitutes "dishonesty or false statement,"4 but the better
reasoned cases strongly indicate that the retail theft and attempted
burglary convictions of Mr. Bruce should not have been admissible at
trial.

In United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),

which this Court cited in its recent 609(a)(1) State v. Banner
decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the legislative
history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate which spawned
the formulation of the rule.

That court quoted the Conference

Committee Report which stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement"
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
Smith, 551 F.2d at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, pp. 7098, 7103).

Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion discussed

in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that crimes of the
type that Mr. Bruce previously had been convicted of committing
would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation.

4

Id. at 362-63.

See generally, Annot. Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions Admissible;
Crimes Involving Dishonesty, 39 ALR Fed. 596 §15.
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Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on
what Congress' intent was with regards to Rule 609 (a)(2).

In a

statement from the court in United States v. Millingsf 535 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior convictions
of Mr. Bruce, the court reasoned:
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element
of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say
that either offense, in the language of the
Conference Committee, is "peculiarly probative of
credibility." Although it may be argued that any
wilful violation of law. . . evinces a lack of
character and a disregard for all legal duties,
including the obligations of an oath, Congress
has not accepted that expansive theory.
535 F.2d at 123.

The clear intent of Congress was to limit the

introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to
those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not
tell the truth.

Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in

Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach.

As the

Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend
to adopt as expanded a position as that would be.

The prior

convictions of Mr. Bruce, retail theft and attempted burglary, do
not bear on his propensity to tell or not tell the truth; they show
no deceit or dishonesty as meant by Congress.

Accordingly, it was

error for the trial court to deny Mr. Bruce's motion to suppress
that information.
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982),
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not
admissible under Rule 609 (a)(2) without a showing of accompanying
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
make such a showing.

The burden rests with the State to

Generally, the court observed that crimes of
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violence, theft crimes (as in the case at bar), and crimes of
stealth do not involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the
proper meaning of Rule 609 (a)(2).

United States v. Seamster, 568

F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978), held similarly.

The court stated that

"dishonesty and false statement" does not include convictions for
burglary (a prior conviction of attempted burglary in the case at
bar) or robbery since the terms are used in a restrictive manner and
are limited to those prior convictions which manifest deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification which would demonstrate that the
accused would be likely to testify untruthfully.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's
propensity to testify truthfully.

The court stated that felony

theft (a prior conviction in the case at bar) does not involve
"dishonesty or false statement" of the credibility-deteriorating
quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2).

Howard v. Gonzales, 658

F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
Mr* Bruce's prior convictions are not demonstrable of a
propensity to lie under oath.

The State made no such showing;

accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in denying
the motion to prevent the evidence from being entered for
impeachment purposes.

The conviction of Mr. Bruce should be

reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for a new
trial without the admission of Mr. Bruce's prior convictions.
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POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS OFFICER
MERRICK'S IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT
Prior to trial/ counsel for the defendant filed a Motion in
Limine to suppress Officer John Merrick's identification of Henry
Bruce (R. 157). The motion was based on a suggestive out-of-court/
one photo show-up conducted by Mr. Merrick (R. 272-74).

The trial

court denied the motion and allowed Officer Merrick to testify (R.
482-83).

Defense counsel properly preserved the issue for appeal by

objecting at trial (R. 488). The Appellant now asserts the trial
court committed prejudicial error by permitting that testimony and
identification by Officer Merrick.
Officer John Merrick, is employed by the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office at the County Jail.

Officer Merrick offered

testimony that while off duty and on his way goose hunting on the
day of the robbery, he observed two black males standing near a
phone booth one half block east of the Corner Mart.

He testified

that he recognized both individuals, recalling the name of one but
not the other.

He testified at trial that the other individual at

the phone booth whom he recognized but whose name he did not know
was Mr. Bruce (R. 484-89).

This identification, however, was the

product of a suggestive show-up and should have been suppressed.
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the United
States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of suggestive show-ups,
stated:
This danger [that the witness may make an
incorrect identification] will be increased if
the police display to the witness only the
picture of a single individual who generally
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resembles the person he saw, or if they show him
the pictures of several persons among which the
photograph of a single such individual recurs or
is in some way emphasized. The chance of
misidentification is also heightened if the
police indicate to the witness that they have
other evidence that one of the persons pictured
committed the crime. Regardless of how the
initial misidentification comes about/ the
witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory
the image of the photograph rather than of the
person actually seen, reducing the
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom
identification.
390 U.S. at 383-84 (footnotes omitted).

The Court, however, then

stated that despite the hazards involved it would be unwilling to
prohibit such photographic show-ups as a per se rule but would
prefer that each be considered on its own facts.

The Court held

that "convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial
following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was
so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."

Id. at 384.

The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position taken in
Simmons adding:
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to
see whether in the identification procedures
there was anything done which should be regarded
as so suggestive or persuasive that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the identification was
not a genuine product of the knowledge and
recollection of the witness, but was something so
distorted or tainted that in fairness and
justness the guilt or innocence of an accused
should not be allowed to be tested thereby.
State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972).

In this case the

trial court was clearly in error when it allowed Officer Merrick to
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testify.

Merrick had no prior face to face conversations or

confrontations with Mr. Bruce.

He testified outside the presence of

the jury during the pre-trial motion to exclude his testimony that
he had only seen Mr. Bruce once or twice before in the halls of the
County Jail (R. 272, 493). Allowing Merrick's testimony with
certain limitations had the effect of limiting defense counsel in
her latitude on cross examination.

For example, she was unable to

pursue where, for how long, and under what circumstances Merrick had
previously observed Mr. Bruce without severely prejudicing her own
client (R. 481-83).
Officer Merrick was on his way to a Seven-Eleven prior to
going goose hunting.

He saw two individuals near a phone booth

while he was stopped at a red light for about one minute (R.
484-85).

He saw them again on his way back from the Seven-Eleven,

again waiting for about thirty seconds to one minute (R. 492). He
was one hundred yards away—across the width of the street and
across a parking lot (R. 488-90).

He could see a frontal view of

the individuals only part of the time as they were moving around and
then the person he did not recognize by name walked away from him
(R. 262-65, 490-92).
Officer Merrick then went goose hunting.

The following day

Merrick went to work and looked at the docket sheets (R. 266). He
saw that the person he recognized by name, Otis Latham, had been
arrested.

He found that the person arrested with Latham was named

Henry Bruce (R. 266). Officer Merrick then pulled Mr. Bruce's
arrest file, looked at the photograph and concluded that Mr. Bruce
was the man he had seen with Latham (R. 266-67).
did not participate in the line-up (R. 494).

Officer Merrick

The United States Supreme Court has commented on an
identification procedure similar to the one used by Officer Merrick
in this case admonishing that "[t]he practice of showing suspects
singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not part of
a lineup, has been widely condemned."
293, 303 (1967).

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.

The actions taken by Officer Merrick were

extremely suggestive.

He confirmed a very short and distant

observation of someone he had recognized from only one or two prior
occasions by going to an arrest file and examining the lone
photograph therein.

The subsequent identification—as stated in

Simmons—is suspect as it is difficult to know whether the
identification is a product of the photograph rather than Merrick's
own recollection.

Furthermore, the Court in Simmons explained that

the identification is further tainted inasmuch as the photograph was
found in conjunction with an arrest, heightening the chance for
misidentification.

The trustworthiness of the in-court

identification was thereby nullified and the trial court erred in
not suppressing the testimony of Officer Merrick.
By allowing Officer Merrick to identify Mr. Bruce at trial,
Mr. Bruce's due process rights were violated.

His position was

prejudiced, and accordingly, the conviction should be reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial without the tainted identification.
In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court catagorized the central question of suggestive
identification cases as "whether under the 'totality of the
circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the
confrontation was suggestive."

To analyze this question the Court
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indicated appropriate factors for consideration to be (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the
witness1 prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5)
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Id.

Applying these factors to the facts in this case, the
totality of the circumstances weigh heavily that Officer Merrick
should not have been allowed to testify.

As noted above, Officer

Merrick's opportunity to view the men at the phone booth was
limited, at best.

He saw them for less than two minutes total and

from a distance of over 100 yards away.

He did not even have a view

of the full face of the man he recognized for all the time as the
men were moving around.

In the short amount of time available for

Merrick to view the two men, it is doubtful that his degree of
attention was anywhere near sufficient to rely upon; he was waiting
at stop lights.

Officer Merrick had other cars in front of him and

must have repeatedly glanced to see if the light had changed.

A

view of two men for less than two minutes total, from 100 yards
away, while repeatedly glancing at the stop light is suspect in and
of itself, let alone reliable for eyewitness testimony.
Yet, Officer Merrick was allowed to testify.

He had given

no prior description to rely upon other than he recognized though
did not know the name of the man.

His level of certainty that Mr.

Bruce was the man he had seen seems adequate at first blush; but
when contrasted with the fact that he had never before talked with
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Mr. Bruce or stood face to face with him in either of the one or two
prior sightings, the subsequent identification becomes totally
suspect and untrustworthy.

The only factor which even facially

appears reliable is the length of time between Officer Merrick's
first look at the men and his identification by the lone photograph
the following day.

But, as the other four factors indicate, under

the totality of the circumstances the method of identification the
following day becomes even more suspect.

By going to an arrest file

to support the identification of the unnamed man, Officer Merrick
completely destroyed what little bit of neutral observation he could
have given.

The arrest file photograph was simply too suggestive

for anyone now to know whether the later in-court identification was
the product of memory from the initial viewing or from the
photograph.

Analyzing this query under the less than adequate

initial viewing of the men by Officer Merrick, the arrest file one
photo show-up greatly increased the chance of misidentification and,
therefore, the in-court identification was much too suggestive for
the trial court to have allowed the officer to testify.
By allowing Merrick to testify, Mr. Bruce's due process
rights were violated and he suffered prejudice.

The conviction

should accordingly be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial
without the tainted identification.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED PREJUCIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY,
At trial defense counsel requested that a cautionary
instruction regarding eyewitness identification be given to the
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jury.

(See Addendum C.)

The trial court refused to give the

instruction and defense counsel took exception (R. 578-79).
The issue of lack of reliability of eye witness
identification has been well documented in legal literature.5
Justice Brennan expressed the concern of many commentators when he
wrote, "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known;
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification."

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).

Echoing this concern, the late Justice Felix Frankfurter observed:
What is the worth of identification testimony even when
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is
proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony
are established by a formidable number of instances in the
records of English and American trials. . . .
Evidence as to identity based on personal impressions,
however bonafide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence the
least to be relied upon, and therefore, unless supported by
other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury.
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, 30 (1927).

5

Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unrealiability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969
(1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of Eyewitness
Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); Eyewitness
Identification Evidence:
Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. L. Rev. 407
(1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face
Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of Eyewitness
Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 361
(1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckout, Determinants of Eyewitness
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y. 191;
Buckout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom,
Crim. Def., Sept. Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckout, Eyewitness Testimony,
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of
Criminal Identification; The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa.
L.Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness
Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8; Tyrell &
Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the
Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976).
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The unreliability of eyewitness identification also has
been much discussed by this Court, of late, recognizing the
complexities involved and mandating a required instruction when
identification is at issue.
(Utah 1986).

See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492

The holding of State v. Long, however, was expressly

limited in its application to those cases tried after its date of
decision.

Id.

Appellant Henry Brucefs trial preceded the Long

decision, and accordingly must be evaluated under the pre-Long
standard which required an examination of whether the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to give the requested cautionary
instruction concerning eyewitness identification.
The pre-Long cases were treated fully in Long and State v.
Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986).

Prior to Long, the giving of a

cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification was a
matter left to the discretion of the trial court after consideration
of circumstances surrounding the identification.
706 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985).

State v. Tucker,

In State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185

(Utah 1981), for example, one witness had substantial opportunity to
observe the defendant while the defendant ordered pizza and waited
for the other customers to leave the restaurant.

Additionally, the

witness also observed the defendant while he robbed two cash
registers and then forced her into a refrigerator.

This Court held

that the trial judge had not abused its discretion in refusing to
give the requested cautionary instruction because of the witness1
abundant opportunity to view the defendant and also general
instructions regarding witness reliability and burden of proof had
been given.
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In State v, Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), the crime
occurred over a seven to eight minute span of time in broad
daylight.

The trial court had not given a requested cautionary

instruction, and no abuse of the trial court's discretion was found
on appeal.

Similarly, no cautionary instructions were given in

State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d
1251 (Utah 1984); nor State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1976).

In

each of these cases the defendants were viewed by the respective
witnesses in daylight's sun for extended periods of time before and
during robberies.

This Court found the witnesses' certainty

regarding the identifications significant and held that no abuse of
discretion occurred in refusing to give the requested instruction.
Despite the fact that this Court had always found in favor
of the trial court's use of its restraint in giving the instruction,
the cases left open the possibility that an abuse of discretion
could occur.

In State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985), this

Court stated that "under suitable circumstances a cautionary
instruction of the type requested would be required."

Id. at 316.

State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, contained language which indicated
that a failure to give a requested instruction may amount to an
abuse of the trial court's discretion if the circumstances
surrounding the eyewitness identification raise serious questions of
reliability.

Id. at 1253-54.

The decision in Reedy also indicated

that the standard of review requires an examination of the "totality
of the circumstances."

Id. at 1254.

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in State v.
Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court did find that a trial
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court abused its discretion in failing to give a cautionary
instruction.

The sole witness in Jonas had a very short look at the

defendant in very poor lighting.

The witness identified the

defendant from a photograph which varied somewhat from the
description he had earlier given the police.

This Court also

indicated that "[t]he victim's trial testimony demonstrated that
there was a great deal of uncertainty and hesitancy in the manner in
which he arrived at his identification of defendant during the photo
array."

Id. at 1381.

This Court held that "the trial court abused

its discretion in not giving a cautionary instruction about the
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification."

Id.

As such,

the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for new trial.
Admittedly, Jonas is the only pre-Long case, to this date,
wherein this Court found that the trial court abused its discretion
in not giving the requested cautionary instruction.

Noteworthy,

however, is that in all other pre-Long cases the witness or
witnesses were all consistent in the identifications of their
respective defendants.6

Jonas was the first case in which even a

hint of uncertainty in identification presented itself.
is more like Jonas than the other pre-Long cases.

This case

In the case at

bar the witnesses displayed much more than a hint of uncertainty and

6

In Reedy, twelve days after the robbery the victim picked the
defendant's picture from a group of six photographs stating that he
was "one hundred percent sure" about the identification. More than
a year later, however, the victim was unable to make a positive
in-court identification of the defendant. The victim's difficulty
with identifying the defendant at trial was because over that period
of time the defendant had lost considerable weight, grew his hair
longer, and curled his hair. 681 P.2d at 1252.
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inconsistency in their ability to identify the defendant; indeed,
this case is replete with misidentifications, a non-identification,
and an identification tainted by a suggestive one photo show-up.
Therefore, given the inherent weaknesses in eyewitness
identification, the trial court should have granted the requested
cautionary instruction which spoke to the particular difficulties in
this factual situation.

Failure to do so was an abuse of the trial

court's discretion.
The factual peculiarities in Mr. Bruce's case will show
that the totality of the circumstances clearly dicated that the
requested cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification be
given.

Four witnesses offered testimony at trial—eyewitness

identifications—that either placed appellant Bruce in the area at
the time of the crime or identified him as a participant in the
crime.

However, none of the four witnesses were able to pick Mr.

Bruce from a police line-up:

two of the witnesses picked the same

other individual, the third picked no one at all, and the fourth did
not even participate.

In fact, the only time the witnesses could

pick the defendant was when he was by himself at counsel table—a
time when he was the only young Black in the room.
Specifically, the first witness to testify at trial was Sue
Ann Candelaria, the employee of the robbed Corner Mart.

She failed

to identify Mr. Bruce at the line-up on January 14, 1986, as the
individual who had robbed the store.

She actually identified

someone else as the robber (R. 316). Later that same day at the
preliminary hearing she did identify Mr. Bruce as the robber.
However, when asked by defense counsel as to why she failed to pick
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Mr, Bruce at the line-up but could identify him at the preliminary
hearing she stated, "You know what you are suppose to do.
been two months.

I don't know what he looks like.

what is the big deal?"

(R. 338-39).

It has

He did it, so

Furthermore, she acknowledged

having seen Mr. Bruce at the line-up earlier that day and that she
did not pick him as the robber (R. 337). She also testified that
she became aware prior to the preliminary hearing that she failed to
pick the "right" person from the line-up (R. 346). These facts
clearly indicate that the reliability of the witness' identification
of Mr. Bruce was at issue.

The requested cautionary instruction

should have been given to alert the jury to the potential for error.
This witness additionally testified that she had been only
an arm's length away from the robber of the Corner Mart (R. 329),
that he spoke to her and she saw his teeth (R. 343). Her
reliability as an eyewitness, however, became even further suspect
because she did not include in her description to the police that
the robber had a small tattoo on his forehead and a gold-capped
front tooth (R. 331). Mr. Henry Bruce has both a small tattoo on
his forehead and a visible gold-capped front tooth; he has had them
from 1969 and 1972, respectively (R. 513).
In short, Ms. Candelaria was an arm's length from the
robber but could not recall physical oddities of the robber.

She

later did not pick Mr. Bruce as the robber—who had allegedly been
so close to her—from a line-up.
else as the robber.

She actually identified someone

In fact, Ms. Candelaria could only identify

Mr. Bruce as the one who had robbed the Corner Mart when he was the
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only Black or one of only two Blacks in the room, the other being
taller, much older and with grey hair (R. 336).
The totality of this witness1 testimony brings to question
whether the testimony she offered was from her own recollection.
The possibility that the testimony was not based on her own
recollection is best viewed through her remark at the preliminary
hearing when she stated, "You know what you are suppose to do.
has been two months.

I don't know what he looks like.

what is the big deal?" (R. 338-39).

It

He did it so

The "big deal," of course, is

that well phrased admonition from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (as quoted in State v. Long, 721
P.2d at 491), warning that "it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free."
The reliability of the identification of Mr. Bruce by this
witness was clearly at issue.

The inconsistencies in this witness1

testimony clearly mandated the giving of the requested instruction.
The requested instruction addressed a number of concerns which were
important for the jury's consideration.

Of specific importance with

regards to this witness were points (2) and (3) of the requested
instruction.

They read:

(2) Are you satisifed that the identification
made by the witness subsequent to the offense was
the product of his own recollection? You may
take into account both the strength of the
identification and the circumstances under which
the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may
have been influenced by the circumstances under
which the defendant was presented to him for
identification, you should scrutinize the
identification with great care. . . .
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(3) You may take into account any occasion in
which the witness failed to make an
identification of the defendant, or made an
identification that was inconsistent with his
identification at trial.
The circumstances of this witness1 testimony dictated that this
instruction be given.

It was an abuse of the trial court's

discretion not to do so.
The second witness, Ruthie K. Barton, is the sister of Sue
Ann Candelaria.
robbery occurred.

She was also present at the Corner Mart when the
She testified as being three to five feet from

the robber with a profile perspective lasting a few minutes (R. 247,
353).

The robber faced and spoke to her at one point, but she—like

her sister—did not include in her description to police nor testify
to having seen a tattoo or a gold-capped tooth (R. 256, 353-54).

In

addition to the in-store observation of the robber, she followed him
from a distance of twenty-five to thirty feet across a street.

She

saw him enter a sidewalk area between apartments in an apartment
complex (R. 354-57).
About ten or fifteen minutes later Ms. Barton overheard a
police dispatch that "a car [had been] stopped that fit the
description of the person" (R. 361). She then accompanied a police
officer to where the car had been stopped and upon arrival
identified "the guy that had been in the store first and then the
other one" (R. 364). The identification of Mr. Bruce as the robber
was based solely on the clothing he was wearing (R. 254). That
clothing was described by the witness as dark corduroys and "a sweat
jacket with white and another color.

It was a dark color."

She

also indicated that the robber was wearing a ski cap (R. 255). When
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stopped by police, Mr. Bruce was not wearing a ski cap and one was
never found by police, either in the car or the immediate area.
Mr. Bruce was, however, wearing corduroys and a two-colored sweat
jacket—both common articles of clothing.
At the line-up Ms. Barton did not select Mr. Bruce as the
robber of the Corner Mart.

She, in fact, chose as the robber the

same other individual that her sister chose; and like her sister,
she too had observed that Mr. Bruce was in the line-up (R. 405-07).
Subsequently, at the preliminary hearing, she identified Mr. Bruce
as the robber.

Again, however, Mr. Bruce was but one of two black

men in the room, the other being taller, older, and grey haired.
Despite the fact that she again pointed at Mr. Bruce at the trial
when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the requested
cautionary instruction should have been given based on the relevant
facts of this witness1 testimony.

Ms. Barton's important eye

witness testimony, like her sister's before her, was suspect because
she chose someone other than Mr. Bruce from the line-up and also
because it is questionable that the in-court identifications were
the product of her own recollection.

Furthermore, the cautionary

instruction should have been given to the jury to alert them that an
"identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which
results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness"
(See requested instruction point (2), Addendum C ) .
The third person providing eye witness testimony regarding
Mr. Brucefs presence in the area near the time of the crime was
Janine Dempsey, an employee of the neighboring Self's Food Town.
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She testified that two men were in her store ten minutes before the
robbery.

She stated that they were in the store "ten seconds at the

most" (R. 465). Her testimony was that she was bending down putting
up a display when they entered.

The shorter man spoke to her, but

she did not notice a gold-capped tooth nor a tattoo.

Ms. Dempsey

did, however, notice Mr. Bruce in the police line-up, but she did
not pick anyone from that line up.
sure.

She stated, "I wasn't absolutely

Therefore, I didnft mark anything down."

(R. 469-73).

She

also testified that while in the store she had noticed the taller,
older man more than the shorter man (R. 466), therefore her
observation of the man she subsequently identified as Mr. Bruce was
extremely limited at best.
Ms. Dempsey identified Mr. Bruce at trial as the shorter
man in her store ten minutes prior to the robbery.

Nonetheless, she

was unable to identify him from the group at the line-up; and
inasmuch as she had a very limited amount of time to observe that
shorter individual, her eye witness testimony was also suspect and
at issue.

Accordingly, the requested cautionary identification

instruction should have been given.

Failure to give that

instruction was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The fourth and final eye witness, John Merrick, is employed
by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office at the County Jail.

While

off duty and on his way goose hunting, he observed two black males
standing near a phone booth one half block east of the Corner Mart.
He testified that he recognized both individuals, recalling the name
of one but not the other.

He testified at trial that the other

individual at the phone booth whom he recongized but whose name he
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did not know was Mr. Bruce (R. 484-89).

This identification,

however, was the product of a suggestive one photo show-up.
Merrick had no prior face to face conversations or
confrontations with Mr. Bruce.

He had only seen Mr. Bruce once or

twice before in the halls of the County Jail (R. 272, 493). Officer
Merrick was on his way to a Seven-Eleven prior to going goose
hunting.

He saw two individuals near a phone booth while he was

stopped at a red light for about one minute.

He saw them again on

his way back from the Seven-Eleven, again waiting for about thirty
seconds to one minute.

He was one hundred yards away—across the

width of the street and across a parking lot (R. 490-92).

He could

see a frontal view of the individuals only part of the time as they
were moving around and then the person he did not recongize by name
walked in a direction away from Officer Merrick (R. 262-65, 492-94).
Officer Merrick then went goose hunting.

The following day

Merrick went to work and looked at the docket sheets.

He saw that

the person he recognized by name, Otis Latham, had been arrested.
He found that the person arrested with Latham was named Henry
Bruce.

Officer Merrick then pulled Mr. Bruce's arrest file, looked

at the photograph and concluded that Mr. Bruce was the man he had
seen with Latham.

Officer Merrick did not participate in the

line-up (R. 266-67, 494).
The actions taken by Officer Merrick were extremely
suggestive.

He confirmed a very short observance of someone he had

recognized from only one or two prior occasions by going to an
arrest file and examining the lone photograph therein.

His

subsequent in-court identification is tained and suspect as it is
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difficult to know whether the identification is a product of the
photograph rather than his own recollection.
492 P.2d 1349/ 1352 (Utah 1972).
appeal.)

See State v. Perry/

(See alsof Point IV of this

The identification is further tainted because the

photograph was found in conjunction with an arrest and therefore/
under highly suggestive circumstances.

Id.

The trustworthiness of

the in-court identification is thereby nullified and the trial court
erred in not giving the requested cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction to the jury.
This case is critically distinct from any prior case
involving the trial court's denial of a cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction.

In this case the state presented four

eyewitnesses; mere number, however, should not add credence to the
state's case.

Each witness' testimony was dubious under the

particular circumstances.

Unlike any prior case where the requested

instruction was refused and later upheld as an appropriate use of
discretion/ here the witnesses made misidentifications or failed to
make an identification from a group# or tainted the identification
by viewing a lone photograph of the accused.
therefore, unquestionably at issue.

Identification was,

The requested cautionary

instruction was designed to alert the jury to the difficulties
inherent in eyewitness testimony.

The totality of the circumstances

in this case demanded that the instruction be given to the jury for
its consideration.

Failure to give the instruction under these

facts amounted to an abuse of discretion and prejudiced the
defendant.

Accordingly/ the conviction of Mr. Bruce should be

reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for new trial
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Henry Bruce, requests that this Court reverse his conviction for
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial with an order
for either dismissal of the charges of a new trial.
/ti
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ADDENDUM A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses afirearmor a facsimile of afirearm,knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery.

ADDENDUM B

Kule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

One of the most important issues in this case is the
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The State has the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable
doubt.

It is not essential that the witness himself be free frcoi

doubt as to the correctness of his or her statement.

However, you

che jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may
convict him.

If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant was the person who committed the crime, you mu?:
find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness.

Its value depends on the opportunity

the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the off^rse
and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness,
you should consider the following:
(1)

Are you convinced that the witness has the capacity

and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe
the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or
»

close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whethar
the witness had had occasion to see or know the parson in the
past.
(2)

Are you satisfied that: the identification made by uhe

witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own
recollection?

You may take into account both the strength of

the identification and the circumstances under which the identificat
was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the
identification with great care.

You may also consider the length

of time that lapsed between the occurence of the crime and the
next opportunity of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor
bearing on the reliability of the identification.
You may also take into account that identification made
by picking the defendant out of group of similar individuals is
generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation
nf the defendant alone to the witness.
(3)

You may take into account any occasion in which the

witness failed to make an identification of the defendant, or made
an identification that was inconsistent with his identification
at trial.
(4)

Finally, you must consider the credibility of each

identification witness in the same way as any other witness,
consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had the
capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the
matter covered in his testimony.
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I again emphasize that the burden of proof of the
•osecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this
lecifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
ubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
th which he stands charged.

If, after examining the testimony,

u have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification,
u must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION

Vs.

One of the important issues in this case is the idonti£-.cati^
of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.

The Stace has

the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt..

It is

not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the
correctness of his or her statement.

However, you the jury, must

be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the
identification of the defendant before you may convict him.

In

appraising the identification testimony of the witnesses you should
consider the following:
(a)

Did the witnesses have the capacity and opportunity

to observe the offender.
(b)

Is the identification made by the witness a product

of his or her own recollection or knowledge.
(c)

Have the witnesses been consistent in recognizing

the defendant as a participant in the offense.
If .after considering these factors you have a reasonable
doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the
defendant not guilty.

